The dominant explanation for the meltdown in the U.S. subprime mortgage market is that lending standards dramatically weakened after 2004. Using loan-level data, we examine underwriting standards on securitized subprime mortgage originations from 1998 to 2007. Contrary to popular belief, we …nd little evidence of a dramatic weakening of lending standards within the subprime market. We show that while underwriting may have weakened along some dimensions, it certainly strengthened along others. Our results indicate that (average) observable risk characteristics on mortgages underwritten after 2004 would have resulted in a signi…cantly fewer ex post defaults if such mortgages had originated in 2001 or 2002. We show that while it is possible that underwriting standards in this market were poor to begin with, deterioration in underwriting after 2004 cannot be the dominant explanation for the collapse of the subprime mortgage market.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom has argued that deterioration in underwriting standards was central to the collapse of the market for subprime mortgages. The hypothesis that "most bad loans are made in good times" has been viewed, by policymakers and academics alike, as one of the principal features of credit crises. 1 The current mortgage crisis in the United States is no exception. Indeed, the recent boom in the U.S. housing market witnessed a surge in nonprime mortgage originations from 2000 to 2006. Given the lower underwriting requirements for nonprime mortgages, this explosive growth naturally caused a decline in lending standards for the overall mortgage market.
Of greater interest, however, is the question of whether there was a decline in underwriting standards within the market for subprime mortgages. There is a remarkable increase in early default rates for post-2004 post- originations, especially during 2006 post- and 2007 . 2 Such high and early defaults on subprime mortgages led both policymakers and academics to believe that there was a signi…cant deterioration in underwriting standards within the subprime mortgage market, particularly for these later vintages. 3 For example, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (March, 2008) 
concluded that
The turmoil in …nancial markets was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004, and extending into early 2007. 4 Much of the same sentiment is echoed in the popular press. 5 Despite the analysis of these 1 There is a signi…cant volume of theoretical and empirical studies supporting this hypothesis (see, for example, Gorton and He, 2008 , and references therein).
2 Figure 1 illustrates the default probabilities by loan age for each year of origination (vintage) of subprime mortgages between 2000 and 2007. The default probabilities are calculated using the Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator (see appendix B and Section 3.2 for more details).
3 Notably, high default rates for [2005] [2006] [2007] vintages occur well before the loan age of 24 (and 36) months, typically the reset date on hybrid adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) products. Clearly, a jump in the payment obligations on hybrid-ARM resets would not explain these high early default rates. In appendix A, we argue that early defaults for post-2004 originations might be better explained if one studies early prepayment patterns on pre-2004 originations. 4 Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments, March 2008 (emphasis in the original). 5 Such examples are ubiquitous in newspaper reports. To cite a few examples: "Strange was becoming increasingly common: loans that required no documentation of a borrower's income. No proof of employment. events in business and academic journals, there has been little economic analysis of the proposition of examining underwriting standards within the subprime mortgage market. This paper presents summary evidence on subprime mortgage underwriting standards. At the cost of parsing the policy statement above too literally, we examine two related questions. First, was there a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards within the subprime mortgage market?
Second, did this "weakening"begin around late 2004 so as to trigger extensive defaults in subprime mortgages? To examine these questions, we study loan-level data on more than 9 million subprime mortgages from the LoanPerformance (LP) database over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . This is the largest available repository on securitized subprime mortgages (see Section 2 for details) . Our aim is to study the underlying distribution and evolution of borrower and mortgage (loan) characteristics in the subprime market with a view to identifying the deterioration in underwriting standards.
We argue that any study of underwriting standards in this environment needs to account for two important features of credit risk that have largely been ignored up to this point. The …rst takes into account the multidimensional nature of credit risk: It is often possible to compensate for the increase in the ex ante risk of one borrower attribute by raising the requirement standards along another dimension. The second involves the idea that while both borrower attributes and mortgage characteristics determine credit risk, the terms and conditions of the latter are largely determined by the former. We address the endogeneity problem that confronts the use of mortgage terms such as loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and mortgage interest rate as explanatory variables in determining loan performance. To this end, we …rst develop a test for endogeneity bias by adopting techniques in Chiappori and Salanie (2000) . Following this, we study the determinants of mortgage characteristics (such as LTV ratio and interest rate) and mortgage delinquencies in the subprime market by accounting for both features mentioned above. Finally, we devise a counterfactual technique to determine whether there was a decline in underwriting standards within the subprime market after 2004.
No money down.I was truly amazed that we were able to place these loans" (The Bubble: How homeowners, speculators and Wall Street dealmakers rode a wave of easy money with crippling consequences. The Washington Post, June 15, 2008) . "House prices levitated as mortgage underwriting standards collapsed. The credit markets went into speculative orbit, and an idea took hold. Risk, the bankers and brokers and professional investors decided, was yesteryear's problem." (Why no Outrage? Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2008) .
Our results show that the hard information available on mortgage originations does not reveal deterioration in underwriting standards for securitized subprime originations, particularly after 2004. 6 Given the multidimensional nature of ex ante credit risk, it is di¢ cult to emphasize weakening in terms of some attributes as a decline in overall underwriting standards. While underwriting may have weakened along some dimensions (e.g., lower documentation), it also strengthened in others (e.g., higher FICO 7 scores). Hard data provide evidence of credible underwriting over this period that attempted to adjust riskier borrower attributes with lower LTV ratios and higher FICO scores. Moreover, there is compelling evidence to suggest that lenders emphasized FICO scores not only as an adequate indicator of credit risk, but also as a means to adjust for other riskier attributes on the origination.
In addition, we present evidence showing that the e¤ectiveness of FICO scores at origination in gauging default risk did not deteriorate over the years. To test the e¤ectiveness of origination FICO scores, we examine the performance of a given change in origination FICO scores in terms of ex post default. 8 We …nd evidence that improvement in FICO score increases the ex post survival probability. Further, if one controls for other attributes on the loan origination, the improvement in FICO score signi…cantly increases the ex-post survival probability, especially for later vintages. Moreover, this result is robust to the inclusion (or exclusion) of contract terms such as cumulative LTV (CLTV) ratio and mortgage rates as controls in this estimation procedure. The result is also robust to di¤erent speci…cations of FICO score groups and to variations in terms of transitions across these groups. In summary, these results seem to suggest that the lender emphasis on FICO scores at the time of origination was not misplaced.
Critical to this result is the evidence of endogeneity bias. Our test of endogeneity bias 6 The results presented here are based on the hard information available on securitized subprime originations. The distinction between hard and soft information follows Stein (2002) . Stein argues that the decision of whether to extend credit on a home mortgage loan application is typically based on hard information because it is readily veri…able and can be credibly transmitted. On the other hand, an unsecured "character loan" is based on soft information that cannot be veri…ed by anyone other than the agent who produces it. This is not, however, to diminish the role of soft information for the subprime market. 7 Borrower credit score at the time of loan origination is denoted by FICO T M (an industry standard developed by the Fair Isaac Corporation) with a number in the range 300 to 850.
8 Using absolute measures to compare the performance of FICO scores across di¤erent default regimes can be misleading. For example, if defaults were to rise because of some exogenous shock, an increase in the default rates would occur across all FICO scores. A more relevant measure in this context would be one that compares loan performance for a given change in the FICO score across the di¤erent default regimes. Accordingly, we compare the di¤erence (increase) in survival probabilities of an origination with a higher FICO score (or belonging to a higher FICO score group) relative to one with a lower FICO score (or belonging to a lower FICO score group). presents evidence of a positive correlation, conditional on observable characteristics, between the individual's choices of LTV ratio (coverage 9 ) and the ex post occurrence of default (risk).
If we do not account for this endogeneity problem and include mortgage terms as explanatory variables in our default estimation, we introduce a positive bias on the explanatory variables such as FICO scores at origination. As a result, the positive bias reduces the magnitude of the negative relationship between FICO scores and ex post default. 10 To address the multidimensional nature of underwriting, we use counterfactual analysis to is unclear how deterioration in underwriting since 2004 can be the dominant explanation of delinquencies in the subprime market. Of course, our analysis does not rule out the hypothesis that underwriting standards in the subprime market were probably poor to begin with. At the very least, unobservable risk characteristics and market conditions (such as house price appreciation) had a greater role than was earlier believed.
There is a large segment of literature analyzing di¤erent features of the subprime mortgage market. Earlier contributions include Cutts and van Order (2005) and Pennington Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007) . More recent papers studying the subprime crisis include Dell'Arricia et al. (2008) , Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009 ), Elul (2009 ), Gerardi et al. (2009 In the interest of familiarity, we retain the use of the term coverage, although semantically, it might be more appropriate to its original usage in the insurance market setting (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) . Throughout the paper, "higher coverage" implies a higher CLTV ratio on the mortgage. 1 0 While the inclusion of mortgage terms certainly dampens the e¤ect of FICO scores on default, it does not reverse the earlier result of improvement in the e¤ectiveness of FICO scores. et al. (2009 ), Mayer et al. (2008 , and Mian and Su… (2008) . Our paper makes several new contributions to this literature. First, we show the change in mortgage underwriting does not explain the widespread defaults and subsequent collapse in the subprime mortgage market. Our results show that while underwriting declined on certain dimensions, a multidimensional study of underwriting fails to provide evidence of a secular decline in underwriting standards. In particular, we present evidence showing that lenders seem to have attempted to o¤set riskier attributes on originations by increasing the average quality of borrowers (as measured by their credit scores) to whom such loans were made. More important, this adjustment appears to have strengthened over the years in our sample period. Second, we provide evidence indicating that, especially on the basis of ex post loan performance for later vintages, lender emphasis on credit scores was not misplaced. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the e¤ectiveness of an increase in credit scores on loan performance actually shows improvement over the years in our sample period. Third, we establish and account for the endogeneity problem that confronts the use of mortgage terms as explanatory variables in determining mortgage default. This endogeneity problem is important, because it introduces a positive bias that dampens the negative e¤ect of (higher) credit scores on mortgage delinquencies. Fourth, we use counterfactual analysis to demonstrate that, at least in terms of underwriting standards, loans underwritten for later vintages would have performed no worse than mortgages of earlier vintages. This raises serious doubts on the conventional wisdom that a decline in underwriting for subprime mortgages is central to the collapse of this market. In contrast, it does not rule out the possibility that the design on subprime mortgage contracts has been ‡awed since its inception.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the summary data on borrower and mortgage characteristics, while Section 3 provides summary evidence on mortgage underwriting. In Section 4, we present a brief discussion of limitations of characterizing underwriting standards and provide a theoretical framework for our analysis. Section 5 provides the evidence on endogeneity bias and estimation results on underwriting and loan performance in the subprime market. The counterfactual analysis is described in Section 6. Section 7 provides a discussion of the results.
Data and Summary Statistics
For the purposes of this study, we analyze loan-level data from the Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) database of the LP data repository. 11 Although this database contains both subprime and Alt-A pools, we restrict our analysis to subprime loans for the purposes of this study. 12 Following industry convention and standard practice in this …eld, we classify a loan as subprime if it belongs to a subprime pool in the ABS database. 13 LP data include only those loans that were securitized in the ABS market, as opposed to loans that were retained by originators in their portfolios. In addition to various borrower and mortgage characteristics, LP records repayment behavior on the loan. Mayer and Pence (2008) We begin our discussion on summary statistics with a brief description of the trends in univariate data. Because the subprime market evolved fairly rapidly over the years in our sample period, we record changes in underwriting standards by vintage (year of mortgage origination) throughout this paper. Around 1998, more than half of subprime originations were …xed rate mortgages (FRMs). Over the years, there has been a clear shift toward the origination of more adjustable rate products (ARMs). Of these, the majority of originations were hybrid-ARM products (e.g., 2/28 and 3/27 mortgage products). 14 At their peak around 2005, hybrid-ARMs 1 1 This is the largest database on nonprime loans with loan-level data on over 17 million nonprime (both subprime and Alt-A) mortgages originated in the United States. However, the dataset is not without its limitations: First, there is little information on the households that held these mortgages. For example, there are no data on household debt, income, employment, or demographics. Second, unlike other studies using mortgage data, the lack of identi…ers in this database makes it di¢ cult to match and combine these data with other databases to broaden the scope of analysis. Third, we do not have data on mortgage applications and are therefore unable to compare approvals to loan applications that were denied. Finally, even for loans in the database, we are unable to track multiple liens or mortgages on the same property.
1 2 Loosely speaking, subprime pools include loans to borrowers with incomplete or impaired credit histories, whereas Alt-A pools include loans to borrowers of higher credit quality but who are unable or unwilling to provide documentation on the loan (Fabozzi, 2006) . 1 3 Other de…nitions involve identifying originations of lenders specializing in subprime originations, or using speci…c criteria such as lower credit scores and so on, to de…ne subprime loans. It is important to understand that the guidelines for selection into subprime or Alt-A pools vary across originators or arranger of the securities. By our de…nition, we classify a mortgage as subprime if market participants labeled this mortgage as subprime at securitization. 1 4 Hybrid-ARMs are specialized products that include an initial period over which the repayment schedule on accounted for almost 80 percent of products in the subprime mortgage market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, teaser rates on hybrid-ARM products were not signi…cantly lower compared to closing rates on other mortgage products in the subprime market. In fact, we do not …nd any signi…cant di¤erence between the unconditional means of closing rates on FRMs and hybrid-ARMs mortgage products. This is true for originations of all vintages in our sample period.
Perhaps a lesser-known fact about subprime mortgages is that a majority (around [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] Table 3 includes terms on the mortgage contract, such as the CLTV ratio and the closing rate spread. The closing rate spread is de…ned here as the di¤erence between the closing rate on the origination (the teaser rate for hybrid-ARMs) and the 30-year conventional mortgage rate. 17 Regression coe¢ cients indicate the presence of underwriting e¤orts to control for overall credit risk by varying credit score requirements on loan approvals. For example, a large negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the full-documentation dummy (both panels) indicates that, after controlling for other borrower attributes, a borrower with low or no documentation has a signi…cantly higher FICO requirement than a similar borrower providing full documentation on the loan. As one would expect, the FICO requirement for loan approval on non-owner (investor) occupied homes is the highest, followed by that on second homes, whereas approvals for owner-occupied originations have the lowest required FICO scores. Not surprisingly, mortgages on properties with greater value have progressively higher required FICO scores. For loans of all vintages, property values in a lower quartile have, on average, a lower FICO score than those property values in the immediately higher quartile. Evidently, re…nances have a lower FICO score, on average, than direct home purchases. The large negative coe¢ cient on the closing rate spread variable in Panel B indicates that originations on low FICO scores in equilibrium have a higher mortgage rate. In addition, equilibrium FICO scores are higher on originations with higher CLTV ratios.
The regression coe¢ cients indicate that underwriters attempted to adjust for borrowers' riskier attributes by requiring higher average FICO scores. Moreover, changes in the size of the coe¢ cients over the years seem to suggest that the size of this adjustment appears to have increased over the years in our sample period. To test this hypothesis more formally, we use a fully interacted dummy variable model of the regression in Panel A of Table 3 . The dummy 1 6 In what follows, we report the regression estimates for all subprime mortgages that originated between 2000 and 2007. The results for the years of origination 1998 and 1999 are not given here but are available on request. Unless mentioned otherwise, regression estimates in the paper control for property type (dummies for singlefamily residence, condo, townhouse, cooperative, etc), property location (dummies for the state in which the property is located), and loan source (dummies for broker, realtor, wholesale, retail, etc).
1 7 The 30-year conventional mortgage rate is the monthly average contract rate on commitments for prime FRMs, released by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. variable takes the value 1 for all originations after a given calendar year and 0 otherwise. We present the estimates on four speci…cations in Table 4, The preceding analysis indicates the presence of credible underwriting (i.e., the appropriate sign on the coe¢ cient). However, we cannot comment on whether such underwriting was adequate in terms of the marginal rates of adjustment across di¤erent borrower attributes (i.e., the magnitude of the coe¢ cient). Stated di¤erently, we observe that the FICO scores on low documentation loans for all the vintages were, on average, higher than those on full- Table 3 ) as opposed to that of 15.14 points (as recorded on loans of 2000 vintage) is su¢ cient to o¤set the increase in the borrower risk pro…le (i.e., the low documentation on loans). Still, the evidence presented above indicates that lenders increasingly relied on FICO scores to o¤set other riskier attributes of borrowers.
FICO Scores and Default Risk
We conclude this section with some evidence on FICO scores and default behavior on subprime mortgages. In doing so, we provide some preliminary evidence that might help explain the increasing reliance on FICO scores. Our data allow for tracking mortgage repayment behavior on a monthly basis, thereby allowing us to determine the current status on the loan in terms of prepayments, delinquencies, and foreclosures. We can also distinguish among a 30-day, a 60-day, or a 90-day delinquency status on the loan. Following industry conventions, we de…ne a mortgage to be in default (or in serious delinquency) if it records a 90-day delinquency event at any point in its repayment history. 18 Default rates and the probability of surviving a delinquency are calculated by using the Kaplan and Meier (1958) At this point, it is important to recall several results from our analysis above. First, our analysis of summary data seems to indicate a trend toward higher FICO scores alongside lower documentation and higher CLTV ratios. Second, we observed that the average FICO score is signi…cantly higher for originations whose other attributes (such as lower documentation or higher LTV ratios) are arguably riskier. Third, we present evidence to suggest that this adjustment strengthened over the years in our sample period. These underwriting patterns suggest that lenders placed emphasis on the FICO score not only as an adequate indicator of credit risk, but also as a means to adjust for other riskier attributes on the origination. With the bene…t of hindsight, some industry experts have faulted originators on this account: ... [T]he crucial mistake many lenders made was relying on FICO credit scores to gauge default risk, regardless of the size of the downpayment or the type of loan. 20 1 9 These results suggest that loan performance on subprime mortgages can hardly be explained by variations in the distribution of product types (Mayer et al. 2008) . For that reason, the results presented here are for data pooled over all mortgage products. Results on individual product types (ARMs and FRMs) are qualitatively similar and are available on request. calculate as a …rst pass the non-parametric estimates of the (unconditional) survival probabilities for originations within each FICO score group. In Section 5, we provide the parametric estimates of the survival probabilities for the group after controlling for other attributes on the origination. Table 5 reports the di¤erence (increase) in the probability of a loan surviving a 90-day delinquency event after two calendar years for originations. For the purposes of this analysis, we split the sample into various FICO score groups at intervals of 40 points, starting at a FICO score of 540. The rows in Table 5 show the percentage point increases in survival probabilities for originations in a higher FICO score group relative to those in its immediately lower FICO score group. Rows 1 and 2 in Table 5 …nd that such increases in survival probabilities among the lowest FICO score groups show deterioration in performance of origination FICO across borne out in terms of the evidence in our data (see Table 8 ).
the vintages. In contrast, rows 4 through 6 show that the highest FICO score groups show improvement in origination FICO performance across the vintages. This contrasting pattern could have motivated the underwriting to seek higher FICO scores on riskier originations. In Section 5, we perform a rigorous test of this hypothesis by controlling for other attributes on the origination. However, it is important to point out that the overall trend is not driven solely by the highest FICO originations. Even without the two highest group "transitions"that show maximum improvements, we do not observe deterioration in FICO performance. This is shown by the average computed in the last row of Table 5 . In appendix C, we con…rm the robustness of this result for other speci…cations of the groups using di¤erent interval widths and starting FICO scores to demarcate these groups. 21
These …ndings are important in our context for two reasons. First, as already discussed, more recent originations with higher FICO scores tend to be riskier in terms of other attributes (i.e., entail a greater likelihood that the origination has a lower documentation or a higher CLTV ratio). Second, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that FICO scores at later vintages did not necessarily re ‡ect the "true" creditworthiness of the borrower. 22 Naturally, one would expect the relative performance of higher FICO scores to be signi…cantly worse than those of earlier vintages. However, we do not …nd evidence to support these hypotheses. In summary, the evidence from our non-parametric tests suggests that lender emphasis on FICO scores was not misplaced.
Mortgage Underwriting, Asymmetric Information, and Endogeneity Bias
The importance of information problems in any borrower-lender scenario cannot be overemphasized, especially when it pertains to a market for borrowers who would not otherwise qualify for more conventional sources of …nancing. In this section, we emphasize the role of information asymmetries in the loan underwriting process. However, it is important to …rst list the limitations of our study in examining underwriting standards for subprime mortgages.
Limitations of Characterizing Underwriting Standards
First, approving loan applications of borrowers who would previously be considered uncreditworthy can be viewed as a weakening of underwriting standards. The subprime market extends credit to borrowers who would otherwise be denied loans in the prime market. Taken to its logical conclusion, one could view the emergence of subprime lending as a weakening of underwriting standards for the U.S. housing market as a whole. Signi…cantly, for loans older than 60 months in our sample, default probabilities on subprime mortgages have never been lower than 0.28. These facts raise important questions about the viability of the subprime market as a whole. However, such questions are beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, it is important to keep in mind that our examination of a weakening in underwriting standards is relative to subprime mortgages of earlier vintages and not vis-à-vis mortgages in other segments of the market (prime, jumbo, and Alt-A).
Second, several characteristics of the borrower are summarized to determine overall credit risk. Lenders are known to compensate for the increase in the ex ante risk of one borrower attribute by raising the requirement standards along another dimension. Stated di¤erently, borrower credit risk is multidimensional. This study takes into account the multidimensional nature of credit risk, arguing that any focus on a single borrower or mortgage characteristic is misleading. Accordingly, de…ning a decline in underwriting standards requires aggregating each borrower characteristic to build a summary measure that ful…lls a variety of desirable conditions. Needless to say, the solution to this aggregation problem has proved elusive. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of a single metric that adequately summarizes a variety of borrower characteristics. Therefore, in Section 6, we adopt a counterfactual technique to cope with this problem.
Third, mortgage underwriting refers to the process used by a mortgagee (lender) to assess the credit risk of the mortgagor (borrower). The process involves summarizing the ex ante risk of default from a pro…le of borrower attributes with the purpose of approving or denying the borrower's loan application. Therefore, underwriting is based on the borrower's observable characteristics at the time of origination.
A …nal caveat relates to the determinants of ex post default on subprime mortgages as a testament to declining underwriting standards. Mortgage characteristics are themselves outcomes of the underwriting process. Cutts and Van Order (2005) show that, in the case of the subprime market, terms of the mortgage contract are determined by variations in borrower attributes. Consequently, treating mortgage terms as exogenous to the likelihood of mortgage default leads to endogeneity bias. The rest of this section discusses this endogeneity problem and the underlying theory in greater detail.
Theoretical Framework and Endogeneity Bias
Theoretical research has long emphasized the potential importance of asymmetric information in impairing the e¢ cient operation of credit markets. There is strong evidence to suggest that loan markets, especially those marked as "nonprime", do not function according to the competitive ideal. For example, Adams et al.(2008) show how moral hazard and adverse selection in the subprime auto-loan market can signi…cantly a¤ect market outcomes, especially since subprime borrowers not only have imperfect or impaired credit histories but also tend to be more liquidity constrained. In this context, theoretical studies on the e¤ect of asymmetric information in the mortgage market assume greater importance (Brueckner, 2000; Cutts and van Order, 2005) . For the purposes of this paper, we draw on such theoretical work and recent empirical studies (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Chiappori et al. 2006 ) that establish the importance of asymmetric information to …nancial market settings. Chiappori and Salanie (2000) show that under both adverse selection and moral hazard, one should observe a positive correlation (conditional on observables) between risk and coverage. 23
If di¤erent mortgage contracts are actually sold to observationally identical borrowers, then the frequency of default among the subscribers to a contract should increase with the LTV ratio on the mortgage. In a model of lender competition under adverse selection, where riskiness is an exogenous and unobservable characteristic of an agent, the correlation stems from the fact that high-risk agents are more likely to opt for the mortgage contract with the lower downpayment but a higher interest rate (Brueckner, 2000) . Under moral hazard, the reverse causality would generate the same correlation: Borrowers buying into mortgages with higher LTV ratios for any unspeci…ed or exogenous reasons are likely to exert less e¤ort to repay the loan and therefore become riskier.
These theoretical results lead to the following two predictions. First, higher-risk subprime borrowers self-select into mortgage contracts that o¤er features (such as low downpayment), that at a given price, are more valuable to them than to lower-risk individuals. Second, equilibrium pricing on underwriting contracts re ‡ects variation in the risk pool across di¤erent contracts. In particular, features of mortgage contracts that are selected by high-risk types should be priced more highly than those purchased by low-risk types. by the borrower's credit grade and FICO score-the interest rates on o¤er vary with the downpayment on the loan. In other words, observably riskier borrowers are required to put up more equity to qualify for the same interest rate. Based on this outline, we can make the following inferences about the process of mortgage origination.
First, conditional on observable risk, borrowers are o¤ered menus of contracts varying in their interest rate and LTV requirements as given in Table 6 . Borrower characteristics de…ne borrower credit grade, which together with borrower credit score, determines the menus of contracts available to the borrower. In terms of actual mortgage originations, this means that a borrower can choose among the contract terms given along a row in Table 6 . Second, within the menu of contracts on o¤er, contracts with a higher LTV ratio typically come with a higher rate of interest. This feature is critical to our understanding of the underwriting process. The borrower's downpayment on the mortgage determines the interest rate on the loan and vice versa. Stated di¤erently, we can use this feature to model the determinants of a mortgage contract on either of these mortgage terms, but not both.
Estimation Strategy
Determinants of loan terms Subprime mortgage contracts are essentially summarized by the following three attributes: (1) product type (FRM or ARM), (2) LTV ratio, and (3) the interest rate (spread over prime rate) on the loan. Evidently, predictions of empirical contract theory are corroborated in terms of common practice (see Table 6 ): A given borrower can choose two but not all of the three terms of the mortgage contract on o¤er. Conditional on observable risk (as summarized from credit grade and scores), a borrower's choice of LTV ratio (and product type) determines the rate (spread) on his or her mortgage. Alternatively, the borrower's choice of monthly payment (mortgage rate) and product type, from among the menu of contracts on o¤er, determines the downpayment requirement (LTV ratio). Accordingly, we can focus our attention to the determinants of the mortgage contract as follows:
where X is a vector of borrower attributes and Z is either the LTV ratio on the mortgage or the interest rate, but not both. It is important to mention here that the …rst and second equations are structural equations that determine product type, but the third equation is a reduced form equation for LTV ratio or interest rate. 25
Determinants of default and delinquency To derive testable predictions about the ex post occurrence of default, we estimate the semiparametric hazard rate regression for the 90-day delinquency event. The hazard function h(t) is the instantaneous probability of delinquency at age t, and is given by
Pr(t T < t + tjT t) t :
Following Cox (1972) , the semiparametric representation that we estimate takes the form
where h 0 (t) is baseline hazard function.
Testing endogeneity bias For mortgages of every vintage, we set up a two-equation model, similar to the approach in Chiappori and Salanie (2000):
The …rst equation, identical to equation (3), is an ordinary least squares regression with LTV ratio (or interest rate spread) as the dependent variable. The second equation, identical to equation (5), is a Cox proportional hazard rate regression model. 26 2 6 The object of interest in a Cox proportional hazard rate regression model is hazard ratio (HR), which has the interpretation of a multiplicative change in the instantaneous probability of delinquency for a marginal change in a particular risk characteristic. HR is analogous to the odds ratio in logistic regressions. Let h(tjX) be the instantaneous probability of delinquency at age t conditional on other characteristics given by vector X. We can de…ne the estimated HR for marginal change in risk characteristic xi as
The martingale residuals of the Cox model are calculated aŝ
whereĤ 0 (t) is the estimated cumulative baseline hazard rate and i is an indicator that takes the value 1 when a delinquency is recorded at loan age t for mortgage i and 0 otherwise.
We estimate the two equations independently and compute the residuals b u i and^ i . Following Chiappori and Salanie (2000) , the test statistic for the null of conditional independence cov(" i ; i ) = 0 is de…ned by
where W is distributed asymptotically as a 2 (1). 27
Results

The Evidence on Endogeneity Bias
The test of endogeneity bias is based on the conditional independence between the individual's choice of LTV ratio (coverage) and the ex post occurrence of the event of delinquency (risk). Table 7 shows the conditional correlation between risk and coverage under various speci…cations.
The …rst speci…cation uses the closing rate spread as the dependent variable in equation (8), while the second speci…cation uses the CLTV ratio. Both speci…cations yield similar results:
The conditional correlations for all vintages are positive and signi…cant. The Chiappori and
Salanie (2000) test statistic in equation (7) likely that the strong endogeneity bias in subprime markets is su¢ ciently weaker when it comes to other mortgage markets (like that for prime mortgages). However, these results con…rm the endogeneity problem that confronts the use of mortgage characteristics such as the CLTV ratio (and interest rate spread) as explanatory variables in determining loan performance.
In our regression on mortgage defaults given below, we show that ignoring this endogeneity bias leads to faulty inferences. The inclusion of endogenous variables such as the CLTV ratio (or the closing rate spread ) as explanatory variables in a default regression introduces a positive bias on estimated coe¢ cients. We can comment on the direction of this bias since the estimated conditional correlations are signi…cantly positive. For explanatory variables such as the FICO score and the full-documentation dummy, one expects a negative coe¢ cient in the hazard rate regression. Consequently, the positive bias introduced by including endogenous variables such as the CLTV ratio reduces the true impact of such explanatory variables on the probability of default.
2 8 The bootstrap methodology can be described as follows. Borrower characteristics on mortgage i with LTV of zi are denoted by Xi. Also, the age in months at which mortgage i faces the 90-day delinquency event is denoted by yi. Constructing the bootstrap con…dence interval involves the following steps:
Step 1: We draw a bootstrap sample (z ; y ; X ) = f(z 1 ; y 1 ; X 1 ) ; (z 2 ; y 2 ; X 2 ) ; : : : ; (z n ; y n ; X n )g with replacement from (z1; y1; X1) ; (z2; y2; X2) ; : : : ; (zn; yn; Xn).
Step 2: From the bootstrap sample estimate equations (6) and (7), recover the OLS residuals on equation (6), and the martingale residuals in equation (9); and calculate the correlation between the two estimated residuals.
Step 3: Repeat the process B times to obtain the distribution of estimated correlation between risk and coverage.
2 9 The absence of a positive correlation does not necessarily imply that such markets do not su¤er from asymmetric information. As Finkelstien and McGarry (2006) demonstrate, alternative tests can reveal the existence of asymmetric information along multiple dimensions. Table 8 reports estimates of equation (6) (1) We observe a scale e¤ect in subprime underwriting. For higher-valued properties, borrowers have lower CLTV ratios on average, presumably because doing so lowers the exposure for lenders. This is re ‡ected in the progressively lower coe¢ cients for properties in higher-valued quartiles, showing that mortgages on properties with higher values have, on average, a lower CLTV ratio. Not surprisingly, originations on lower-valued properties with consequently higher CLTV ratios, have higher interest rates.
Determinants of Mortgage Terms
(2) Owner-occupied homes have signi…cantly higher CLTV ratios and lower rates than nonowner occupied homes. Here, too, underwriting seems to have succeeded in getting non-owners (i.e., investors) to make greater downpayments on loans of identical size.
(3) Mortgages with full documentation have signi…cantly higher CLTV ratios and lower rates than low-or no-doc loans. But the size of the CLTV coe¢ cients in Panel A declines over the sample period. Evidently, underwriters'e¤ort at tempering low-documentation loans with lower CLTVs, on average, was probably weakening over the years. However, originations with lower documentation required higher mortgage rates over the years, as seen from the size of the interest rate coe¢ cients in Panel B.
(4) Borrowers with higher FICO scores are also the ones with higher CLTV ratios. But here the trend of adjustment of FICO scores with lower CLTV ratios seems to have grown stronger over the years. Also, equilibrium mortgage rates are lower for borrowers with higher FICO scores.
(5) No cash-out re…nances have lower CLTV ratios than purchases. This is hardly surprising given the property price appreciation for most of our sample period. However, re…nances (both cash-out and no cash-out) have lower CLTV ratios and lower mortgage rates than purchase originations. This result is explained below.
It is interesting to compare the signs on the coe¢ cients in the CLTV regression (Table 8) with those in the FICO regression (see table 3 ). Given our a priori judgment of risk characteristics, the signs on the coe¢ cients seem to indicate evidence of credible underwriting. For example, note that while full-documentation is associated with a lower FICO score, borrowers providing full documentation on loans are allowed to make a lower downpayment. The important exception is the sign of coe¢ cients on loan purpose. Although borrowers'FICO scores are lower on average for re…nances, these re…nances also have lower CLTV ratios. Typically, loans are re…nanced with the original lender, and, because of a recorded payment history, mortgage re…nances are considered to be less risky a priori. This could explain the lower FICO score on re…nances. Explaining the CLTV result requires a more nuanced view of subprime originations:
Gorton (2008) shows that in the event of house price appreciation lenders can bene…t even from a re…nancing option, so long as the borrower does not extract the full amount of the appreciated value. 30 This implies that lenders try to ensure that the borrowers retain su¢ cient equity in the property on a re…nance, which could explain why re…nances have lower CLTV ratios, on average, than purchases.
In summary, our results indicate that the underwriting process attempted to adjust riskier borrower characteristics with lower CLTV ratios (and higher mortgage rates). Again, there is little evidence to suggest any signi…cant deterioration in underwriting standards after 2004. Table 9 reports the estimated hazard ratios for the Cox proportional hazard rate regressions in equation (7). Here too, we control for borrower attributes, lender characteristics, property type, and property location. Panel A reports the hazard ratios for borrower characteristics excluding mortgage terms. Panel B includes mortgage terms such as CLTV ratio and the closing rate spread as explanatory variables. Clearly, a priori beliefs about the e¤ect of individual borrower characteristics on credit risk are validated; originations with full documentation have a signi…cantly lower probability of default than low-doc or no-doc loans. For example, the hazard ratio on the full-doc dummy variable for the 2003 vintage (Panel A) indicates that the default probability of a loan with full documentation is 0.7451 times the default probability on the origination with low-documentation for the same vintage. Likewise, a higher CLTV ratio increases the probability of default: We estimate a 1.0194 times increase in the probability of default for an increase in one percentage point of the CLTV in 2003 (Panel B) . 31 In the same manner, the likelihood of default on the mortgage is reduced if the property is owner-occupied rather than for investment purposes and if the loan originated is a re…nance as opposed to a direct purchase. Finally, within originations of the same vintage, those with higher FICO scores have a signi…cantly lower probability of default than those with lower FICO scores. The model provides a good …t of the data. In appendix C, we report the Kaplan-Meier survivor function and the model-implied survivor function for the vintages 2005-2007. To con…rm our earlier summary results in Section 3, we estimate the same regression by using dummy variables for each of seven di¤erent FICO score groups. The groups selected for this regression are the same as those given in Table 5 . The hazard ratios are provided in Table   10 with the lowest FICO score group (< 540) chosen as the base group. This procedure enables us to assign default probabilities across the various FICO groups and helps answer questions about the e¤ectiveness of FICO scores across the various vintages. We estimate the probabilities of default for a FICO group as the product of the (actual) probability of default for the base group (for each vintage) times the hazard ratio for the FICO score group (see appendix B for details). Table 11 reports the increases in probability of surviving a 90-day delinquency for originations in a higher FICO score group relative to those in its immediate lower FICO score group, after controlling for other attributes on the origination. The results show that after controlling Comparing the survival probabilities in Table 5 with those in Table 11 reveals an interesting trend. In Section 3.2, we documented deterioration in performance over the vintages for lower FICO originations (rows 1 and 2 in Table 5 ). However, after controlling for other attributes, Table 11 shows that this trend is reversed for lower FICO originations. Similarly, we recorded a sharp improvement in performance of FICO for higher FICO originations (rows 4 through 6 in Table 5 ). Whereas controlling for other attributes on the origination dampens this improvement in Table 11 , the trend is not reversed. These trends can be explained in terms of our earlier results that there was an attempt to adjust riskier attributes with higher FICO scores and that this adjustment strengthened for the later vintages. Stated di¤erently, originations of later vintage with higher FICO scores are more likely to have riskier attributes on average. Controlling for these riskier attributes would dampen the trend of improvement in FICO performance as seen from Table 11 . Conversely, lower FICO originations on more recent vintages are less likely to have riskier attributes on average. Therefore, in controlling for these attributes, their improvement in performance is su¢ ciently large to reverse the earlier trend of deterioration in performance.
Determinants of Mortgage Default
Viewed independently, the evidence in Tables 10 and 11 reveals little about underwriting standards. On the other hand, when these regression results are examined in conjunction with the other results in Tables 3, 8 , and 11, a clearer picture of underwriting standards emerges.
Earlier, we showed evidence to suggest that the underwriting process attempted to adjust riskier borrower characteristics with higher FICO scores (Section 3.1) and lower CLTVs (Section 5.2).
These results also suggest that lenders adjusted higher CLTV ratios with higher FICO scores and that the strength of adjustment increased over the years. In this section, the hazard rate Table 11 ).
Counterfactual Analysis
From the standpoint of mortgage and borrower characteristics as well as ex post default, observable underwriting trends do not provide evidence of a secular decline in lending standards.
Moreover, there is no discernible change for post-2004 originations. On the contrary, we …nd evidence of credible underwriting in terms of the right direction of adjustment (higher FICO scores on low-doc originations) and some evidence to suggest this adjustment was strengthened over the years. However, we have yet to determine whether the adjustment was "adequate"in terms of its magnitude. At the heart of this analysis is the problem of aggregating a multidimensional pro…le of borrower attributes to a single metric that could summarize the overall credit risk of the borrower. Although this would help determine whether underwriting standards declined over this period, we are not aware of a direct solution to this problem.
In this section, we attempt to cope with this problem by using a counterfactual exercise.
In so doing, we answer the following question: How would ex post default rates change if a 
where function f maps (S v;0 (t) ; X) into the range of S v (t):
For our purposes, the objective is to forecast the impact on the survivor function of vintage v 2 in the environment of vintage v 1 . 32 In this speci…cation, let X 1 and X 2 denote the representative borrowers of vintages v 1 and v 2 ; respectively. If unobservable characteristics and market conditions captured by the baseline survivor function are applied to the di¤erent borrower characteristics, we can identify the e¤ect of X 2 on the survivor function in v 1 as follows:
Such a counterfactual exercise helps us test the following hypothesis:
Null Hypothesis: Let S v (t) be the survivor function for vintage v and age of mortgage t;
and S e v v (t) be the counterfactual survivor function, which is the result of the forecasting problem described above, then S v (t) S e v v (t), for all t:
We proceed as follows: First, we estimate the Cox proportional hazard model in equation (7) for a given vintage v. Next, we calculate the estimated survivor function for the represen-3 2 This problem is similar to P-2 on program evaluation in Heckman and Vyltacil (2007) . With these tools in place, we can now use our counterfactual analysis to test the null hypothesis that there was no dramatic weakening of underwriting standards beginning around late 2004. The null hypothesis is that mortgages approved after 2004 are equally as likely to survive an event of default as those of earlier vintages-namely, 2001, 2002, and 2003-in the environment of these vintages. 34 The results of counterfactual analysis are summarized in Table 12 . Table 12 has three panels corresponding to the counterfactual exercises using survivor To check the robustness of our results, we conduct a similar counterfactual analysis, this time including CLTV ratio and closing rate spread as explanatory variables for the counterfactual estimates. As mentioned earlier, doing so introduces an endogeneity bias to our estimates.
But we proceed nevertheless and the survival plots are shown in the lower panel of Figure 2 .
In comparison, the second counterfactual exercise reduces the di¤erences in loan performance across the vintages. However, even with the inclusion of loan characteristics, the results of the counterfactual exercise remain robust. Evidently, the origination of mortgages with high CLTV ratios in later vintages did not have a signi…cant impact in terms of ex post default. In summary, the counterfactual analysis is strong evidence against the hypotheses that a weakening of underwriting standards can explain recent defaults in subprime mortgages.
Discussion and Assessment
We fail to …nd evidence of deterioration in underwriting standards for later vintages of securitized subprime mortgages. Moreover, in light of the evidence, it is di¢ cult to conclude that underwriting was central to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. This non-result is a signi…cant departure from conventional wisdom on the subprime crisis. However, it is not di¢ cult to see why a discerning reader may not …nd this result implausible. The argument that a signi…cant deterioration in underwriting after 2004 triggered the collapse of the subprime market implicitly suggests that originations of earlier vintages had relatively robust underwriting.
Taken to its logical conclusion, it could also suggest that the underwriting framework for earlier vintages could help provide a sustainable framework for subprime originations for the future.
In contrast, our results do not rule out the possibility that the design of subprime contracts could be ‡awed since the inception of this market.
There is su¢ cient evidence to suggest that this might indeed be true. Gorton (2008) enumerates the reasons underwriting to subprime borrowers would require a fundamental change to underwriting standards compared with other prime markets. Moreover, as he argues, if the interest rate on the mortgage is set to price the risk, such a rate is not likely to be a¤ordable to these borrowers. Adams et al.(2008) show that the interest rates on subprime auto loans are signi…cantly higher than those on subprime mortgages. As Gorton (2008) demonstrates, the subprime mortgage design embedded a price appreciation that made this market extremely dependent on home price appreciation. Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2009) show how prepayments were integral to the design on subprime contracts and how the subprime boom was sustained by high and early prepayments during a period of considerable house price appreciation (also see appendix A).
As with any empirical study of this kind, there are limitations in our study. First, it is extremely important to state that our conclusions are drawn from data available at the time of loan origination. Subsequent behavior of the borrower (e.g., originating a second lien on the property) is undeniably important in determining ex post delinquency and default. However, this would hardly provide a basis for determining a decline in underwriting at origination. Second, it is possible that there were borrower attributes observed by the lender but not reported in the LP data. Lack of data often hinders a conclusive argument on some important characteristics, for example, the debt-to-income ratio. Using di¤erent data, Mian and Su… (2008) report that aggregate mortgage debt-to-income ratios for entire zip codes have increased signi…cantly in the borrower population. However, using the debt-to-income ratios in the LP database on individual mortgages creates signi…cant problems. First, there are very few data on the front-end debt-to-income ratio. Second, even for the back-end ratio, the …eld is sparsely populated for earlier vintages in the LP data. For the data that are available, we observe a trend of increasing (back-end) debt-to-income ratios. Again, our regression results show attempts to control for this increase by increasing other borrower attributes, namely, the FICO score. Appendix C presents the evidence on debt-to-income ratios.
Third, some observers may doubt the veracity of the data. Some anecdotal evidence points to poor reporting, false documentation, and outright fraud. 35 However, it is di¢ cult to make this case for a signi…cant proportion of a repository of more than 9 million loan observations. Fourth, it needs to be mentioned that our examination of the underwriting standards is at the level of the individual borrower and not at the level of the lending institution. We do not examine the hypothesis if, for example, the fraction of originations with high CLTV ratios were disproportionately high for a particular lending institution. Fifth, it is important to note that our sample includes mortgages that have been securitized as subprime. Our sample does not include loans that were classi…ed as subprime but retained by originators in their portfolios.
Therefore, loans that default even before they can be securitised are not part of our dataset.
Since our data do not cover these very early defaults before securitization, we have a possibile selection bias in our results.
Finally, as is well known, the guidelines for classi…cation into the subprime and Alt-A categories vary by arranger. There is signi…cant evidence that points to a deterioration of underwriting standards in Alt-A mortgages (Sengupta, 2009 ). Because both Alt-A and subprime mortgages are likely to have the same originators, this result at …rst pass may seem implausible.
However, a plausible explanation to our …ndings on securitized subprime mortgages might be explained in terms of anecdotal evidence on subprime. In their handbook chapter on Alt-A mortgages, Bhattacharya et al. (2006, p. 189) 
Conclusion
This paper presents a contrarian perspective on underwriting standards in the subprime market.
Our examination of the LP data on securitized subprime originations shows scant evidence of a decline in underwriting standards. Moreover, our counterfactual analysis demonstrates that, at least on average, we can reject the hypothesis of no decline in underwriting standards in favor of improvement in underwriting standards. Of course, we cannot reject the premise that underwriting standards in the subprime market were poor to begin with. However, the question remains: What sustained the phenomenal growth in the subprime market for nearly a decade.
And, of course, why did the subprime market collapse?
Gorton (2008) argues that the subprime mortgage contracts were designed as bridge …nanc-ing to give temporary credit accommodation to borrowers in anticipation of future earnings growth, buildup of borrower equity through a rise in house prices, or both. In a similar vein, Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2009) The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities (for the first two years after origination) of originations in the higher FICO score group relative to those in the lower FICO score group. The Kaplan-Meier probabilities are calculated as discussed in appendix B. The FICO score groups used below are "< 540", "540-579", "580-619" … "700-739" and "≥740". The rate sheet is for fixed rate mortgages with two-year prepayment charge. The worksheet assumes full documentation, one unit house, and loan amount in the range $200,000 to $417,000. In case of secondary financing (CLTV > LTV) and credit score less than 660 (or ≥660) rate is adjusted upward by 155 basis points (or 90 basis points). For a similar table showing the rates available in 2002, see Table 4 in Cutts and van Order (2005) . The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels respectively.
LTV
FICO score 0.9934*** 0.9937*** 0.9932*** 0.9917*** 0.9917*** 0.9937*** 0.9943*** 0.9955*** CLTV ratio 1.0099*** 1.0148*** 1.0137*** 1.0194*** 1.024*** 1.0266*** 1.0293*** 1.0265*** 
